Let's make private data into a public good by Mazzucato, M
Hed: They need us more than we need them 
Dek: Internet giants are using us for our private information. Let’s start acting like it. 
 
 
The internal combustion engine has been dominant for over a hundred years—not because it’s the 
best possible engine, but because through historical accident it gained an initial advantage. The 
QWERTY keyboard layout was designed to be deliberately inefficient because the mechanical keys of 
the typewriter would jam less frequently. That feature is no longer relevant but it doesn’t matter—
we’re still typing on QWERTY keyboards because that’s what people are used to. 
 
The same principle is what makes Google or Facebook or Amazon so massive. We use them because 
we’re used to using them. Google’s not just a search engine, it’s an email address (Gmail), a 
conference-call maker (Hangouts), a document creator and editor (Docs)—all of which are designed 
to maximize the advantages of sticking with Google: if you don’t have a Gmail address, you can’t use 
Google Hangouts. And so on. 
 
Why is this a problem? Well, maybe because these giants are making huge profits from a technology 
(the internet) that was originally developed by the military with taxpayer money. Indeed, Google’s 
algorithm came from NSF funding, and the internet came from DARPA funding. The same is true for 
touch screen display, GPS and SIRI. From this patient finance provided by Uncle Sam rather than 
venture capital, the tech giants created de facto monopolies while evading the type of regulations 
that would rein in monopolies in any other industry. And their business model is built on taking 
advantage of the habits and private information of the very taxpayers whose funds were used to 
create the internet in the first place. 
 
Apologists like to portray the internet giants as forces for good. They praise the sharing economy in 
which digital platforms empower people via free access to everything from social networking to GPS 
positioning to health monitoring.  
 
But Google doesn’t give us services for free. It’s really the other way around—we’re handing over to 
Google exactly what it needs. When you use Google’s services it might feel like you’re getting 
something for nothing, but you’re not even the customer—you’re the product. The bulk of Google’s 
profits come from selling advertising space and users’ data to firms. Facebook’s and Google’s 
business models are built on the commodification of personal data, transforming our friendships, 
interests, beliefs, and preferences into sellable propositions.  
 
The so-called sharing economy is based on the same idea. It’s not about altruism; it’s about allowing 
the market to reach into areas of our lives—our homes, our vehicles—previously beyond its scope.  
 
This new way in which we get goods and services is often referred to as “platform capitalism.” 
Instead of interacting with some kind of institution (like a travel agency), customers interact with 
each other. The role of a company, then, is not to provide the service but to connect sellers (like 
someone who owns a car and is willing to drive it) with buyers (someone who needs a ride). These 
“platforms” are presented as a radical transformation in the way that goods and services are 
produced, shared, and delivered. But they’re also an easy way for companies to avoid responsibility. 
When disabled users complain to Uber about their drivers refusing to put wheelchairs in the trunk, 
Uber says, well, we’re not a taxi company, we’re just a platform. Airbnb is similarly reluctant to take 
responsibility for the safety of the premises offered on its site, or for racial discrimination against 
renters by property owners. After all, Airbnb didn’t build the apartments and doesn’t own them—
it’s just a platform. 
 
And because of network effects, the new gig economy doesn’t spread the wealth so much as 
concentrate it even more in the hands of a few firms (see TK, page TK). Like the internal combustion 
engine or the QWERTY keyboard, once a company establishes itself as the leader in a market, its 
dominance becomes self-perpetuating almost automatically. 
 
Google accounts for 70 percent of online searches in the US, and 90 percent in Europe. Facebook has 
more than 1.5 billion users, a quarter of the planet’s population. Amazon now accounts for around 
half of the US books market, not to mention e-books. Six firms (Facebook, Google, Yahoo, AOL, 
Twitter, and Amazon) account for around 53 percent of the digital advertising market (with just 
Google and Facebook making up 39 percent). Such dominance means online giants can impose their 
conditions on users and customer firms. Book publishers, for example, might be unhappy with the 
conditions Amazon imposes but they have no leverage—there are no other Amazons to turn to. By 
the same token, you might not be happy about Facebook appropriating, storing, analyzing, and 
selling your personal data to third parties, but as long as all your friends are on Facebook, there is no 
equivalent competitor you can turn to.  
 
Historically, industries naturally prone to being monopolies—like railways and water—have been 
heavily regulated to protect the public against abuses of corporate power such as price-gouging. But 
monopolistic online platforms remain largely unregulated, which means the firms that are first to 
establish market control can reap extraordinary rewards. The low tax rates that technology 
companies are typically paying on these large rewards are also paradoxical, given that their success 
was built on technologies funded and developed by high-risk public investments: if anything, 
companies which owe their fortunes to taxpayer-funded investment should be repaying the 
taxpayer, not seeking tax breaks.  
 
The other question we should ask is how the value of these companies has been created, how that 
value has been measured, and who benefits from it. If we go by national accounts, the contribution 
of internet platforms to national income (as measured for example by GDP) is represented by the 
advertisement-related services they sell. But does that make sense? It’s not clear why ads should 
contribute to the national product, let alone social well-being—which should be the aim of economic 
activity. Measuring the value of a company like Google or Facebook by the number of ads it sells is 
consistent with standard neoclassical economics, which interprets any market-based transaction as 
signaling the production of some kind of output—in other words, no matter what the thing is, as 
long as a price is received, it must be valuable. But in the case of these internet giants, it’s 
misleading: if online giants contribute to social well-being, they do it through the services they 
provide to users, not through the accompanying advertisements.  
 
This way we have of ascribing value to what the internet giants produce is completely confusing, and 
it’s generating a paradoxical result: their advertising activities are counted as a net contribution to 
national income, while the more valuable services they provide to users are not.   And the 
discussions about the value they are producing misses the collective contributions that make it 
happen. 
 
Let's not forget that a large part of the technology and necessary data was created by all of us, and 
should thus belong to all of us. The underlying infrastructure that all these companies rely on was 
created collectively (largely financed via the tax dollars that built the internet), and it also feeds off 
network effects that are collectively produced.  There is indeed no reason why the public data 
should not be owned by a public repository that sells the data to the tech giants, rather than vice 
versa. But the key issue here is not just getting a part of the pie of profits from data back to the 
citizens, but also allowing them to better shape the evolution of the digital economy so that it 
satisfies public needs. Using big data and AI for improving the services provided by the welfare 
state—from health care to social housing—is just one example.  
 
Only by thinking about digital platforms as having been created collectively can we construct a new 
model that creates something of real value, driven by public purpose.  We seem never far from a 
media story that stirs up debate about new regulation for tech companies—creating this sense of a 
war between the interests of those companies and national governments. We have to move beyond 
this narrative. The digital economy must be co-shaped; it is a partnership of equals where regulators 
should have the confidence to be market shapers and value creators.  
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